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Abstract: The existence of financial intermediaries is arguably an artifact of information asymmetry.
Beyond simple financial transactions, financial intermediation provides a mechanism for information
transmission, which can reduce the degree of information asymmetry and consequently increase
market efficiency. During the process of information transmission, the bank is able to provide
unique services in the production and exchange of information. Therefore, banks have comparative
advantages in information production, transmission, and utilisation. In credit provision, it is possible
for lenders to make Type I and Type II errors. These types of errors are associated with whether
banks decide to lend money to borrowers with low repayment capacity or risk missing out on
potentially profitable lending. However, the recent US subprime loan crisis and previous financial
crises (such as the Mexican, Argentinian, Chilean and Asian financial crises) show it is possible
that banks can make both good and bad lending decisions. Does this mean that banks have lost
their comparative advantages in leveraging information asymmetry? This Special Issue includes
contribution in empirical methods in banking such risk and bank performance, capital regulation,
bank competition and foreign bank entry, bank regulation on bank performance, and capital adequacy
and deposit insurance.
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The Special Issue in Commercial Banking has been successfully published in the Journal of Risk
and Financial Management (JRFM). The Special Issue welcomes contribution in empirical methods in
banking such as bank loans announcement, credit constraints, capital regulation and bank behaviour,
bank regulation on bank performance, corporate governance in banking, maturity transformation risk
in banking and bank’s merger and acquisition.
With this in mind, the Special Issue features six papers that address several exciting topics of interest
to our readers. The lead paper by Nguyen (2019) explore the relationship between revenue diversification,
risk and bank performance using data from audited financial statements and annual reports of 26
commercial banks listed and unlisted in Vietnam during the period 2010–2018. Using the Generalized
Method of Moment modeling techniques, the author’s result shows that diversification negatively impacts
profitability and the higher the diversification, the higher the risk of commercial banks.
Nguyen et al. (2019) investigate the effect of capital on bank risk employing a meta-analysis
approach based on a wide range of empirical papers from 1990 to 2018. Their result shows negative
effect of bank capital on bank risk, which implies the discipline role of bank capital, is more likely to be
reported. However, the reported results are suffered from the publication bias due to the preference for
significant estimates and favored results.
Using panel data for the period from 2005–2018, Li et al. (2019) evaluate the level of competition
in the Indian banking sector overall as well as within the three groups of banks: foreign owned, state
owned (public sector), and privately owned. They found that the overall competition in the Indian
banking sector is strong, although there are differences by type of bank ownership. The Indian banking
market continues to be characterized by monopolistic competition. The various policy measures
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taken by the Indian government in recent years appear to have helped boost competition. A policy
suggestion would be to further liberalize the banking sector for foreign investment
Using the double bootstrap data envelopment analysis, Yang et al. (2019) measure bank efficiency
and examine the relationship between regulation, supervision, and state ownership in commercial
banks in the Asia-Pacific region for the period 2005 to 2014. Their results indicate that excluding
off-balance sheet activities in efficiency estimations lead to underestimating of the pure technical
efficiency, while overestimating the scale efficiency of banks in the Asia-Pacific region. Their bootstrap
regression results suggest that bank regulation and supervision are positively related to bank technical
efficiency, while state ownership is not significantly related to bank efficiency.
Chen et al. (2019) examine the interactive role of bank competition and foreign bank entry in
explaining the risk-taking of banks over the globe. Using the pooled regression model and Two-stage
Least Squares model (2SLS with Generalized Method of Moments GMM), they document that foreign
bank entry decreases the risk-taking behavior of the banks to a certain level and exhibits an inverted
U-shaped relation with financial stability. Furthermore, the joint effect of bank competition and foreign
bank entry brings financial fragility because host banks tend to make risky investments due to undue
competition induced by foreign bank entry. Their result supports the competition–fragility hypothesis
when foreign bank entry goes beyond a certain threshold.
Finally, Jumreornvong et al. (2018) investigate how deposit insurance and capital adequacy affect
bank risk for five developed and nine emerging markets over the period of 1992–2015. Although full
coverage of deposit insurance induces moral hazard by banks, deposit insurance is still an effective
tool, especially during the time of crisis. On the contrary, capital adequacy by itself does not effectively
perform the monitoring role and leads to the asset substitution problem. Implementing the safety nets
of both deposit insurance and capital adequacy together could be a sustainable financial architecture.
An immediate-effect analysis reveals that the interplay between deposit insurance and capital adequacy
is indispensable for banking system stability.
I hope you are delighted with the content of this Special Issue. JRFM is committed to providing
you with stimulating and dynamic papers in future issues. I invite readers to suggest “themes” for
special issues in JRFM future issues. We want JRFM to reflect your research interests and needs.
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